Hi @tayl7973_1825 ,
Thanks for clarifying it. Based on that, I would say that "Vulnerabilities" are most definitely the wrong tool for the job. You can certainly "hammer in a screw" but there's a better way to do it - and we don't make "screw hammers" at Inedo 
We're working on best practices / guidance on how to build security policies around these topics, but I'll try to give some tips now.
What you're describing isn't a vulnerability per se, but a SAST Issue: a potential weakness in code detected by a static analysis security tool. Most of these are false positives and present no real security risks, but some are.
If you discover a SAST Issue in one of your libraries, then you should use the following process:
- Evaluate if it's a false positive or not
- Unpublish the library internally if there's a security risk
- Enumerate the consumers (i.e. applications in flight or deployed to production)
- Evaluate the security risk (low, high), based on the consumers/usage
- Notify the application teams to upgrade the library as appropriate
Note how this process is fundamentally different than OSS packages / vulnerability workflows:
- you can unpublish/block packages from your repository
- you know which applications are consuming your packages
- you know which teams maintain which applications
- you can work with those teams to assess the risks
Bottom line: if a package causes a real security risk, then unpublish it and fix the consuming applications as appropriate. Otherwise, don't.
There's really no middle ground or room in this process for "Vulnerabilities" - and trying to curate an internal "vulnerability database" is just going to make things less secure in your organization.
That's a theme in our upcoming content, but the general idea is when you treat all issues/vulnerabilities as security risks, then it's impossible to focus on the ones that are actual risks -- and it's as meaningless as saying "everything is a top priority".
Thanks,
Steve